Weighted Banzhaf interaction indexes and weighted least squares by Marichal, Jean-Luc & Mathonet, Pierre
Weighted Banzhaf interaction indexes and
weighted least squares
J.-L. Marichal and P. Mathonet
University of Luxembourg, Mathematics Research Unit, FSTC
{jean-luc.marichal,pierre.mathonet}[at]uni.lu
In the framework of cooperative game theory, several notions
of power indexes are used in order to measure the inﬂuence that a given player
has on the outcome of the game, or to deﬁne a procedure to share the beneﬁts of
the game among the players. The best known power indexes are certainly due to
Shapley and Shubik [9], and to Banzhaf [1], but there are many other examples
of such indexes in the literature.
When one is concerned by measuring the power or analyzing the general
behavior of players within a game, the information provided by a power index
might not be suﬃcient. For instance, power indexes give no information on how
players interact within the game. The notion of interaction index was introduced
in order to measure such information. The ﬁrst example of such an index goes
back to Owen in 1972. A systematic approach was initiated by Grabisch and
Roubens from 1996 and led to the deﬁnition of Shapley interaction index, Banzhaf
interaction index, and many others (see [4] and the references therein).
There is no universal power or interaction index that can be used in every
practical situation. The choice of such an index often depends on some desirable
properties that are relevant to the problem under consideration. Therefore many
axiomatic characterizations of power indexes and interaction indexes have be
proposed so far [9, 3, 6].
Besides these axiomatic characterizations, the Banzhaf and Shapley power
indexes were shown to be solutions of simple least squares approximation pro-
blems :
 Charnes et al. [2] considered the problem of ﬁnding the best eﬃcient ap-
proximation of a given game by an additive one in the sense of weighted
least squares. They showed that the Shapley power index appears as the so-
lution of the approximation problem for a speciﬁed choice of weight system
of the coalitions.
 Hammer and Holzman [7] considered the problem of approximating a gi-
ven pseudo-Boolean function by a pseudo-Boolean function of lower degree,
in the sense of standard least squares. They showed that the Banzhaf po-
wer index appears as coeﬃcients of the linear terms in the solution of the
approximation problem by functions of degree at most one. This observa-
tion was generalized in [5], where the authors showed that the Banzhaf
interaction indexes appear as leading coeﬃcients of best least squares ap-
proximations of pseudo-Boolean functions.
Recently, we used this standard least squares approximation approach to extend
the notion of interaction index for classes of functions deﬁned on the unit hyper-
cube of Rn. However, when we use a standard least squares problem to deﬁne an
index, we implicitly consider that all coalitions of players stand on the same foo-
ting. Here we follow the Hammer and Holzman's approach, but we add a weighted
probabilistic point of view : we consider the framework of pseudo-Boolean func-
tions but we assign a weight w(S) to every coalition S of players. We interpret
this weight as the probability of formation of the coalition. This probabilistic
point of view was considered for instance in [2, 8]. We then naturally deﬁne a
weighted Banzhaf index associated to w by considering the leading coeﬃcients of
the approximation of a speciﬁed degree.
We then investigate the main properties of this class of weighted Banzhaf
indexes parameterized by the possible suitable weights w, such as linearity, sym-
metry, and dummy player condition. We prove that they all belong to the class
of so-called probabilistic interaction indexes axiomatized in [4], and that they
induce linear transformations on the set of pseudo-Boolean functions.
Finally, using the results of [5], we show that the classical Banzhaf and Shapley
indexes can actually be interpreted as barycenters of natural subfamilies of these
weighted indexes.
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